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Abstract
We study the problem of ranking sets of options in terms of free-
dom of choice. We propose a framework in which both the diversity of
the options and the preferences of the agent over the options do play a
role. We formulate some axioms that re°ect these two aspects of free-
dom and we study their logical implications. Two di®erent criteria for
ranking sets are characterized, which generalize some of the rankings
proposed so far in the literature.
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1 Motivation
Recent research in the ¯eld of normative economics has been characterised
by various attempts to depart from the standard welfaristic framework and
move towards wider foundations based on non-utilitarian values. One of the
most active research programmes in this area aims at introducing liberty as
an intrinsically relevant principle in the evaluation of alternative states of
a®airs. The interpretations of freedom advanced in this literature revolve
around the idea that to be free an agent has to enjoy access to options to
choose from. Hence the problem of measuring a person's freedom is handled
by ¯nding a suitable measure of the set of options she faces. There is now
an extensive literature concerned with the measurement of freedom. A non
exhaustive list would include Arrow (1995), Bossert et al. (1994), Jones
and Sugden (1982), Klemisch-Ahlert (1993), Pattanaik and Xu (1990, 1998,
1998a, 2000), Puppe (1996), Sen (1991, 1993), Suppes (1987). Surveys of
this literature may be found in Barbera', Bossert and Pattanaik (2001) and
Peragine (1999).
The analytical framework generally used in this literature is the follow-
ing: X (with generical element x; y; z; etc.) is a ¯nite set of all conceivable
objects of concern for any individual, and P (X) (with generic elements
A;B; C; etc.) denotes the set of all non-empty subsets of X. An element
of X is an opportunity or an option, and an element of P (X) is an oppor-
tunity set. The problem is that of ranking opportunity sets on the basis of
freedom of choice. Hence, let º be a binary relation over P (X), interpreted
as \o®ers at least as much freedom as", with » and Â being respectively the
symmetric and asymmetric components of º . For any set A, its cardinality
is denoted by #A.
A starting point is the article by Pattanaik and Xu (1990): they char-
acterize axiomatically a criterion for ranking opportunity sets in terms of
freedom of choice, introducing three axioms as follows. First (Indi®erence),
every unit set should be freedom-wise indi®erent to every other: for all op-
tions x; y 2 X; fxg » fyg : Second (Monotonicity), more opportunity should
mean more freedom: 8x 6= y 2 Z; fx; yg Â fxg ; third (Independence), if a
set A is judged to give at least as much freedom as another set B, then
that ranking will be una®ected by the addition to or subtraction from each
of an alternative x not contained in either: for all A;B 2 P (X) and for all
x 2 X¡fA[Bg; A º B if and only if A[fxg º B[fxg : These axioms yield
the simple cardinality result (Pattanaik and Xu 1990): for all A; B 2 P (X) ;
º satis¯es the axioms Indi®erence, Monotonicity and Independence if and
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only if
A º B , #A ¸ #B:
This criterion, which applies only to ¯nite opportunity sets, ranks them
according to the number of options they contain. It is a quantity-based
ranking rule, in which there is no role for information about the nature
or the value of di®erent alternatives. This cardinality-based rule is not
supported by the authors: rather they judged it as a trivial rule.
A ¯rst explanation of the triviality result is given by Sen (1990, 1991,
1993): the root of the problem is that we ¯nd it absurd to dissociate the
extent of our freedom from our preferences over the alternatives. According
to Sen's view, the axiomatic structure of Pattanaik and Xu (1990) fails to
capture that aspect of freedom linked to the possibility of choosing what is
valuable to us. This is what Sen calls the `opportunity aspect' of freedom.
>From this point of view, an individual is free if she has access to alternatives
that she regards as valuable in terms of some criteria. These criteria may
be her own actual preferences - as Sen seems to suggest - or, alternatively,
a given set of potential preferences.
Jones and Sugden (1982) ¯rst suggested the use of potential preferences
in assessing a person's freedom, and interpreted the potential preferences
as the preferences of a \reasonable" person. For them, the intrinsic value
of freedom of choice should be judged not in terms of the preferences that
the agent actually has, nor in terms of his future preference ordering, but in
terms of the preference orderings that a reasonable person can possibly have.
According to them, for instance, if any reasonable person would be indif-
ferent between two particular alternatives, then o®ering the choice between
these two alternatives to any person would contributes little to her freedom
of choice. Pattanaik and Xu (1998) build on Jones and Sugden's idea of
reasonable preferences and construct a ranking consistent with it. In com-
paring two opportunity sets, A and B, Pattanaik and Xu (1998) concentrate
on max (A) and max (B), where max (A) is the set of all alternatives in A
which reasonable persons may choose from the feasible set A; and similarly
for B. The model they propose has the virtue of capturing the opportunity
aspect of freedom - i.e., the value of the di®erent alternantives - without
collapsing into an indirect utility ranking1.
1A di®erent approach is proposed by Romero-Medina (2000): he ¯rst considers the set
max (X) of all alternatives in the universal set X that reasonable people will choose if the
universal set was feasible. Then he concentrates on max (X) \ A and max (X) \ B when
comparing A and B.
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The reasonabless criterion to de¯ning the set of potential preferences
has been criticised, among others, by Bavetta and Peragine (2000) and by
Bavetta and Guala (2001). Bavetta and Peragine (2000), speci¯cally, while
agreeing with the idea that freedom should be assessed by looking at options
and potential preferences, nonetheless they settle for an alternative point of
view on potential preferences, according to which all and only the preference
relations available to an agent in a given choice situation should be taken
into account in the assessment of her own freedom. Hence they admit cases
in which not only the set of options di®er from one individual (one situation)
to the other, but also the set of available preference relations. They de¯ne
an opportunity situation as a pair composed by the set of options available
to a decision maker and the set of potential preference orderings that she is
confronting in a speci¯c choice situation. Then, in comparing two opportu-
nity situations, they say that (Bavetta and Peragine 2000, Theorem 2) an
individual i enjoys more freedom than another individual j if and only if the
choice set that his preference pro¯les elicit from his own opportunity set A
has at least as many elements as the choice set that j can elicit by means of
his own preference pro¯les from B. This approach, apart from the speci¯c
interpretation advanced by Bavetta and Peragine, is very general from an
analytical viewpoint, in that it contains, as special case, the situation where
the sets of potential preferences available to agents are all the same - i.e.,
the case considered by Pattanaik and Xu (1998). Therefore, in dealing with
the role of preferences in assessing a person's freedom, this last approach
will be followed in the present paper.
A di®erent explanation of the triviality of the pure cardinality rule is
suggested by the authors themselves (Pattanaik and Xu, 1990): it is not
necessarily dependent on the dissociation of the extent of freedom from the
preferences over the alternatives. Instead, they put the blame on the last,
independence axiom: it does not take into account the extents to which the
di®erent alternatives are \close" or similar to each other. Thus, a devel-
opment along this line of criticism amounts to introduce formally a notion
of closeness or similarity of options, and to reformulate the independence
axiom. This is the direction undertaken by the same authors in a subse-
quent paper (Pattanaik and Xu, 2000) and, more recently, by Bossert et al.
(2001).
To sum up, the axiomatic structure of Pattanaik and Xu can be ques-
tioned on the basis of two considerations. First, it does not consider the
fundamental link between freedom and preferences, therefore failing to cap-
ture the \opportunity" aspect of freedom. Second, as the authors point out,
it does not take into account the \similarity" or \closeness" aspect of the
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available alternatives; this is the \variety" aspect of freedom. These two
considerations motivate the basic directions of research undertaken in the
literature on the measurement of freedom in the last years.
However, each of the two questions has been addressed very much in
isolation from the other. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a
uni¯ed framework for the analysis of the two themes.
The basic ingredients of our framework are the following: (i) a notion of
similarity which can be represented by means of a binary similarity relation
on the universal set of options (see Pattanaik and Xu, 2000), and (ii) a set of
preference relations over the options, interpreted along the lines of Bavetta
and Peragine (2000).
We propose some axioms that capture both the variety and the opportu-
nity aspect of freedom, and study their logical implications. Various criteria
for ranking opportunity sets are characterized, which generalize some of the
ranking proposed so far in the literature.
2 The analytical framework
2.1 Notation
We are denoting by X the universal ¯nite set of opportunities, by P (X) the
set of opportunity sets, and by N = f1; :::; ng the set of agents.
We ¯rst introduce information about the individual preferences over the
opportunities.
A decision maker's preference relation is denoted by R. R is a complete,
re°exive and transitive binary relation de¯ned over X. The set of all possible
preference pro¯les is denoted by ¦ = fR1; : : : ; Rmg. Thus, 8x; y 2 X; 8h 2
f1; :::; mg; xRhy means that \x is preferred to y according to the preference
ordering Rh": In our framework each of the n individuals in the society holds
a set ¦i; i 2 N; of preference orderings, where ¦i µ ¦. P (¦) = 2¦ ¡ f;g
represents the set of all subsets of preference pro¯les.
As explained in the previous sections, we are interested in ranking oppor-
tunity situations. An opportunity situation is a pair (A; ¦i) 2 P (X)£P (¦).
Hence our ranking is represented by a binary relation º over P (X)£P (¦).
The expression (A; ¦i) º (B;¦j) should be read as \the opportunity situ-
ation (A; ¦i) o®ers at least as much freedom as the opportunity situation
(B; ¦j)".
We then introduce the following de¯nition: 8(A;¦i) 2 P (X) £ P (¦) ;
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we de¯ne the choice set as:
maxi(A) = fx 2 X : /9y 2 A such that yRx for some R 2 ¦ig:
We now introduce the information about similarity of alternatives.
Let S be a re°exive and symmetric binary relation over X : xSy means
that x is similar to y;x /Sy means that x is not similar to y: For all A 2 P (X) ;
A is homogeneous if and only if, 8a; a0 2 A; aSa0: For all A 2 P (X) ; a
similarity based partition of A is de¯ned as a class fA1;:::; Amg such that:
(1) Ak µ A;8k = 1; :::;m; (2) [mk=1Ak = A; (3) A1; :::; Am are pairwise
disjoint; (4) Ak is homogeneous 8k = 1; :::; m: The similarity based par-
tition is denoted by Á (A) ; Á0 (A) ; Á00 (A) ; etc: Let © (A) be the set of all
similarity partitions Á (A) of A such that, for every similarity partition
Á0 (A) ;#Á0 (A) ¸ #Á (A) : So, © (A) is the set of all smallest similarity
based partitions of A: For all x 2 X and all A 2 P (X) we say that xSA if
and only if xSa 8a 2 A: For all A;B 2 P (X) , with A homogeneous, we say
that A does not mimic B if and only if, for all Á (B) 2 ©(B) there exists
a 2 A such that, for all Bi 2 Á (B) ; it is not true that aSBi.
Next we impose some axioms on º, which capture our intuition on the
extent of freedom enjoyed by the decision maker under alternative situations.
We assume ¯rst that the relation º is transitive.
3 The axioms
In this section we consider several axioms that de¯nes properties of the bi-
nary relation º over X: We divide these axioms in three di®erent groups:
Preference based, Similarity based and constructive axioms. This classi¯-
cation has to do with the objective of our paper of characterizing binary
relations that embodies both the opportunity aspect of freedom and the
variety aspect.
3.1 Preference based axioms
Axiom 1 Indi®erence between no-freedom situations (INF).
8A; B 2 P (X) ; 8¦i; ¦j 2 P (¦) ; [maxi(A) = fxg and maxj(B) =
fyg] ) (A; ¦i) » (B; ¦j).
According to this version of indi®erence between no-freedom situation, if
two opportunity situations de¯ned over meaningful choices lead to as many
choice sets that are singletons, then the degree of freedom that they o®er is
the same.
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Axiom 2 Inclusion monotonicity (IMON) 8A;B 2 P (X) ; 8¦i; ¦j 2 P (¦) ;
Á(A) = Ak and Á(B) = Bs if Ak ¶ Bs and maxi(Ak)nBs 6= ;; then (A;¦i) Â
(B; ¦j). If Ak ¶ Bs and maxi(Ak) n Bs = ;; then (A; ¦i) » (B; ¦j) :
IMON adapts a preference independence axiom, one that Sen (1991)
called weak dominance, to the present context. IMON requires that set
inclusion of relevant alternatives implies preference. It restricts the role of
non-relevant alternatives and excludes them from consideration when a set
is compared with one of its subsets.
3.2 Similarity based axioms
Axiom 3 Indi®erence between Similar situations (ISS).
8A; B 2 P (X) ; 8¦i;¦j 2 P (¦) ; Á(A) = Ak and Á(B) = Bs] )
(A;¦i) » (B;¦j).
Axiom ISS is in spirit similar to the principle of no choice situation in-
troduced by Jones and Sugden (1982) and used by Pattanaik and Xu (1990).
This principle considers that if two opportunity set are singleton, then de
degree of freedom o®ered by them is identical. In ISS this indi®erence situ-
ation is attributed to sets where all the alternatives are similar according to
the similarity relation de¯ned. It is important that preferences are playing
no role on the de¯nition of this axiom.
Axiom 4 Similarity Monotonicity (SM). 8A 2 P (X) ; A homogeneous,8¦i 2
P (¦) ; 8x 2 X¡A; [xSa; 8a 2 A] ) (A [ fxg;¦i) » (A; ¦i) and :[xSa;8a 2
A] ) (A [ fxg;¦i) Â (A; ¦i) :
The SM axiom was introduced in Pattanaik and Xu (2000). This axiom
explicitly takes into account information about similarity of alternatives in
the simple cases involving freedom comparisons of an existing set A in which
all the elements in A are similar to each other and an enlarged set A [ fxg
where x is outside of A.
In choosing di®erent modes of transport , if the option of
traveling by a red bus is similar to the option of traveling by a
blue bus, then it is plausible to argue that the set fblue bus ,
red busg o®ers the same amount freedom as the set fred busg;
and if traveling by a red bus is not similar to traveling by a red
train, then it is reasonable to argue that the set fred bus , red
traing o®ers more freedom than the set fred busg.
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SM thus formally requires that, given a homogeneous set A and x 2 X=A,
if x is similar to all the elements in A , then the addition of x to A does
not change the degree of freedom already o®ered by the opportunity set A
, and if x is dissimilar to at least one element in A , then , adding x to A
will actually increase the degree of freedom .
3.3 Constructive axioms
Axiom 5 Similarity Composition (SC). 8A;B;C; D 2 P (X) ; 8¦i; ¦j 2
P (¦), such that B \D = A\C = ;; C and D are homogeneous and C does
not mimic A;
[(A; ¦i) º (B; ¦j) and (C;¦i) º (D; ¦j)] ) (A [ C; ¦i) º (B [ D; ¦j):
SC is a weaker version, proposed by Pattanaik and Xu (2000), of an
axiom proposed originally by Sen (1991). Sen's axiom requires that , given
A \ C = B \ D = ; , if [A º B and C º D], then [A [ C º B [ D], and
, if [A Â B and C º D], then [A [ C Â B [ D]. However , in our context
, a modi¯cation of Sen's axiom seems to be warranted . Suppose A = fag,
B = fbg, C = fcg and D = fdg and suppose the elements of these four
sets are all distinct . Let aSc and b /Sd, i.e. a and c are similar but b and d
are dissimilar. In view of this , we can justi¯ably feel that adding c to the
set fag does not signi¯cantly increase the degree of freedom while adding
d to the set fbg does . In that case , we may be unwilling to accept that
[A[C º B [ D] even if [A º B and C º D]. SC deals with this problem of
Sen's axiom by restricting the applicability of the axiom to the case where
both C and D are homogeneous , and C does not mimic A .
Axiom 6 Composition (COM) i®, for all A;B;C; D 2 P (X) ; such that
maxi (A) \ maxi (C) = maxj (B) \ maxj(D) = ; ;
[(A;¦i) % (B;¦j) and (C; ¦i) % (D;¦j)] ! [(A [ C;¦i) % (B [ D;¦j)] ; and;
[(A;¦i) % (B;¦j) and (C; ¦i) Â (D;¦j)] ! [(A [ C;¦i) Â (B [ D;¦j)] :
The COM axiom was originally de¯ned by Sen (1991) and it required
A \ C = B \ D = ;. We adapt the axiom to the context of this paper, by
requiring the no intersection condition to hold only for the maximal elements
in the relevant sets.
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4 The ¯rst ranking
We start our exercise by characterizing an ordering which incorporates both
information about preferences and the similarity of alternatives using a car-
dinal approach. First we select the alternatives that, in a given set A, are
relevant according to the available preferences ¦i, i.e., maxi (A); then we
count the number of elements in the similarity based partition of maxi (A),
that is the number of elements contained in Á (maxi(A)) :
De¯nition 1 º = º 1 i® and only if for all (A;¦i); (B;¦j) 2 P (X) £
P (¦) ;
(A; ¦i) º (B;¦j) , #Á (maxi(A)) ¸ #Á (maxj(B))
8Á (A) 2 ©(A) ; 8Á (B) 2 ©(B) :
That is, an opportunity situation (A; ¦i) o®ers more freedom of choice
than another opportunity situations (B;¦j) if and only if the number of al-
ternatives contained in Á (maxi(A)) is bigger than the number of alternatives
contained in Á (maxj(B)) :
We now characterize the ordering just introduced.
Theorem 1 º = º 1 if and only if º satis¯es the axioms INF, SM, SC
and COM.
P roof. The necessity part of the proposition is straightforward; we
prove only the su±ciency part2. Hence, let º satisfy INF, SM, SC and
COM.We ¯rst prove that:
(1) 8A 2 P (X) ;8¦i 2 P (¦), (A; ¦i) » (maxi (A) ; ¦i) :
If maxi (A) = A; then the result clearly follows. If not, suppose #maxi(A) =
g and let maxi(A) = fa1; : : : ; agg and A¡maxi(A) = A^: Now, maxi
³
fa1g [ A^
´
=
maxi (fa1g) = fa1g and maxi
³
fa2g [ A^
´
= maxi (fa2g) = fa2g: Hence by
INF, ³
fa1g [ A^;¦i
´
» (fa1g;¦i)
and ³
fa2g [ A^; ¦i
´
» (fa2g; ¦i) :
2This proof makes extensive use of results in Pattanaik and Xu (2000).
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Clearly, fa1g \ fa2g = ;, maxi (fa1g [ fa2g) = (fa1g [ fa2g),
³
fa1g [ A^
´
\³
fa2g [ A^
´
= A^ and A^ \
³
maxi
³³
fa1g [ A^
´
[
³
fa2g [ A^
´´´
= ;: Hence
we can apply axiom COM and obtain,³
fa1g [ fa2g [ A^; ¦i
´
» (fa1g [ fa2g;¦i) :
By considering successively a3; a4; :::; ag; and applying INF and COM re-
peatedly, we ¯nally obtain³
maxi (A) [ A^; ¦i
´
» (maxi (A) ;¦i)
or
(A;¦i) » (maxi (A) ;¦i) :
By (1) and transitivity, we obtain:
(2) (A; ¦i) º (B;¦j) , (maxi(A); ¦i) º (maxj(B);¦i) :
Now consider that, according to INF; (fxg;¦i) » (fyg;¦j) : This is
what required by the axiom INS in Pattanaik and Xu (2000); moreover,
axioms SM and SC correspond, respectively, to the S-Monotonicity and the
S-composition axioms of Pattanaik and Xu (2000). Therefore, on the basis of
Theorem 4.6 of Pattanaik and Xu (2000), we know that, for all Á (A) 2 ©(A)
and for all Á (B) 2 ©(B) ; (A;¦i) º (B;¦j) if and only if #Á (A) ¸ #Á(B):
Hence we have:
(3) (maxi(A);¦i) º (maxj(B); ¦i) , #Á (maxi(A)) ¸ #Á (maxj(B)) :
Finally, (2) and (3) imply:
(A;¦i) º (B;¦j) , #Á (maxi(A)) ¸ #Á (maxj(B)) :
5 The second ranking
In this section we characterize a second ordering. This ordering also incorpo-
rates both information about preferences and similarity by using a cardinal
approach. For a given set A; we ¯rst study the similarity based partition
Á (A) = fA1; :::; Amg; then, for each Ak 2 Á (A) ; we concentrate on the
relevant alternatives, as elicited by the available set of preferences: i.e., on
maxi(Ak); ¯nally, we aggregate the sets maxi(Ak) for all the k = 1; :::;m;
and we denote the resulting set by maxi (Á(A)). Formally,
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De¯nition 2 For all A 2 P (X) ; for all ¦i 2 P (¦) ; for all Á (A) =
fA1; :::; Amg 2 ©(A) ;
maxi (Á(A)) := [mk=1maxi (Ak)
We now de¯ne our second ordering:
De¯nition 3 º = º 2 i® and only if for all (A;¦i); (B;¦j) 2 P (X) £
P (¦) ;
(A; ¦i) º (B; ¦j) , #maxi (Á(A)) ¸ #maxj (Á(B))
8Á (A) 2 ©(A) ; 8Á (B) 2 ©(B) :
That is, an opportunity situation (A; ¦i) o®ers more freedom of choice
than another opportunity situations (B;¦j) if and only if the number of al-
ternatives contained in maxi (Á(A)) is bigger than the number of alternatives
contained in maxj (Á(B)) :
We now characterize the ordering º 2.
Theorem 2 º = º 2 if and only if º satis¯es the axioms ISS, IMON, and
COM.
P roof. The necessity part of the proposition is straightforward; we
prove only the su±ciency part. This proof has two stages. Let % satisfy
ISS, COM and IMON. First, we show that:
for all A;B 2 Z; if #maxi (Á(A)) = #maxj (Á(B)) ; then (A; ¦i) » (B; ¦j):
(1)
Suppose A; B 2 P (X) and #maxi (Á(A)) = #maxj (Á(B)) = g: Let
maxi (Á(A)) = fa1; :::; agg and maxj (Á(B)) = fb1; :::; bgg : By ISS,
fa1g » fb1g (2)
and
fa2g » fb2g : (3)
fa1g\fb1g = fa2g\fb2g = ; and, further maxi (Á fa1g) = fa1g ;maxi (Á fa2g) =
fa2g and maxj (Á fb1g) = fb1g ;maxj (Á fb2g) = fb2g ; since a1; a2 2 maxi (Á(A))
and b1; b2 2 maxj (Á(B)) : Hence by (2), (3) and COM, we have
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fa1; a2g » fb1; b2g : (4)
By ISS, again,
fa3g » fb3g : (5)
By (4), (5) and COM,
fa1; a2; a3g » fb1; b2; b3g : (6)
Proceeding in this way, we ¯nally have fa1; :::; agg » fb1; :::; bgg ; that is
maxi (Á(A)) » maxj (Á(B)) : If A = maxi(Á(A)); then A » maxj (Á(B)) :
Suppose fAnmaxi(Á(A))g 6= ;. Let fAnmaxi(Á(A)g = f¹a1; :::; ¹amg 6= ;:
It is clear that T1 = maxi(Á(A)) [ f¹a1; :::; ¹amg is such that T1 µ A and
maxi(Á(A) n T1 = ;: Then, by IMON, T1 » maxj (Á(B)) : Hence we have
(A;¦i) » maxj (Á(B)) : (7)
Similarly, by IMON, from (7), we have (A;¦i) » B; which proves (1).
Next, we show:
for all A;B 2 Z; if #maxi (Á(A)) > #maxj (Á(B)) ; then (A; ¦i) Â (B; ¦j):
(8)
Suppose A;B 2 P (X) and #maxi (Á(A)) > #maxj (Á(B)) : Let #maxj (Á(B)) =
g and #maxi (Á(A)) = g + t (where t > 0). Further, let maxi(Á(B)) =
fb1; :::; bgg and maxi (Á(A)) = fa1; :::; ag; :::; ag+tg: Note that maxi(Á fa1; :::; agg) =
fa1; :::; agg : Hence, by (1),
fa1; :::; agg » (B;¦j) (9)
since maxi (Á(A)) = fa1; :::; ag; :::; ag+tg it is clear that Tg+1 = maxi(Á fa1; :::; agg)[
fag+1g is such that fa1; :::; agg µ Tg+1 and maxi(Á(Tg+1) n fa1; :::; agg 6= ;:
Then by IMON and (9), it follows that
Tg+1 Â fa1; :::; agg
and by (9)
Tg+1 Â maxj (Á(B)) : (10)
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Taking (10), adding ag+2; :::; ag+t on the left hand side, and using IMON
repeatedly, we have
fa1; :::; ag+tg Â (B;¦j): (11)
Taking (11) and using an argument similar to the one used to establish (7),
by IMON, we have (A; ¦i) Â (B;¦j); which proves (8). (1) and (8) complete
the proof of the su±ciency part of the proposition.
According to the rule characterized in theorem 2, given a set A and a
similarity partition Á (A) = fA1; :::; Amg; we should concentrate, for each
Ak 2 Á (A) ; on the set of relevant alternatives maxi(Ak); and we should
then aggregate these sets for all k = 1; :::;m. A di®erent approach, that at
¯rst sight could seem appealing, would amount to ¯rst concentrating on the
relevant alternatives in the overall set, i.e., maxi(A); then, to focus on the
relevant options contained in each similarity class, i.e., maxi(A)\Ak; ¯nally,
in aggregating the resulting sets over the m class, hence obtaining the set
[mk=1 (maxi(A) \ Ak) : One moment re°ection on this alternative rule, how-
ever, reveals that, in so doing, all the information about similarity are lost.
In fact, it turns out that [mk=1 (maxi(A) \ Ak) = maxi(A); hence a rank-
ing based, say, on the cardinality of the set [mk=1 (maxi(A) \ Ak) would be
equivalent to a ranking based on the cardinality of maxi(A). The similarity
relation becomes completely irrelevant.
6 Relation with the literature
Before concluding we wish to draw the attention of the reader toward the
relationship that exists between our ranking and some of the main results
achieved so far in the literature. As the following remarks illustrate, the
rules proposed in this paper have the nice property of generalizing some
important results so far axiomatized in the literature.
The basic ingredients of our analysis are the similarity relation on the
set of alternatives and the set of preferences available to the agents. The
following remarks show what happens when these aspects of freedom are
deemed to be irrelevant.
We ¯rst study the case of irrelevance of the similarity relation:
Remark 1 If /9 a; b 2 X such that aSb; then the ranking established in
Theorem 1 coincides with the ranking established in Theorem 2 and with the
rule characterized by Bavetta and Peragine (2000) (proposition 5.2).
We now turn to the case of irrelevance of the preference relations:
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Remark 2 Suppose that the set of preference orderings ¦ satis¯es a \rich-
ness" assumption, such that 8A 2 ¦(X) ; max(A) := fx 2 A : /9y 2 A such
that yRx for some R 2 ¦g = A: Then, if 8i 2 N;¦i = ¦, all possible pref-
erence pro¯les can be hold by the individuals, and the ranking established in
Theorem 1 coincides with the Simple Similarity-based Ordering of Pattanaik
and Xu (2000). Moreover, in this case, the ranking established in Theorem
2 coincides with the Simple Cardinality-based Ordering of Pattanaik and Xu
(1990).
We now consider the case of irrelevance of the similarity relation and of
the preference relations:
Remark 3 Suppose, again, that ¦ satis¯es the \richness" assumption, such
that 8A 2 ¦(X) ; max(A) := fx 2 A : /9y 2 A such that yRx for some
R 2 ¦g = A: If, in addition to assuming that 8i 2 N;¦i = ¦, we assume
that /9 a; b 2 X such that aSb; then the ranking established in Theorem 1
coincides with the ranking established in Theorem 2 and with the Simple
Cardinality-based Ordering of Pattanaik and Xu (1990).
The ¯nal remarks studies the consequences of adopting the \reasonable"
preferences view, in the case of irrelevance of the similarity relation.
Remark 4 If 8i 2 N; ¦i = ¦¤, where ¦¤ stands for the set of reasonable
preference pro¯les µa la Jones and Sugden (1982) and Pattanaik and Xu
(1998), and, moreover, /9 a; b 2 X such that aSb; then the ranking established
in Theorem 1 coincides with the rule characterized by Pattanaik and Xu
(1998) (proposition 5.1).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to provide a uni¯ed framework for the analysis of
the opportunity aspect and of the the variety aspect of freedom. The basic
ingredients of our framework are the following: (i) a notion of similarity,
represented by means of a binary similarity relation on the universal set of
options (see Pattanaik and Xu, 2000), and (ii) a set of preference relations
over the options, interpreted along the lines of Bavetta and Peragine (2000).
We have proposed some axioms that capture both the variety and the
opportunity aspect of freedom, and studied their logical implications. Two
di®erent criteria for ranking opportunity sets have been characterized, where
both preferences and diversity of options do play a role. These criteria
generalize some of the rankings proposed so far in the literature.
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One possible extension of this work would consist in considering a more
articulated notion of similarity, along the line of Bossert et al. (2001). This
will be the subject of future research.
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